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Focus ON HEALTH CARE REFORM




On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (PPACA), cited by The New York Times as "the most
expansive social legislation enacted in decades' and by opponents as
"Obamacare." 3  The bill has been subjected to wide-ranging support and
criticism, but much of the discussion on both sides has been inaccurate,
misleading, and highly partisan. Between multiple published versions, extensive
* Former Editor-in-Chief. MD/JD Candidate, Washington University School of Medicine and
Yale Law School.
1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
[hereinafter PPACA].
2. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, Obama Signs Health Care Overhaul Into Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 23, 2010, at Al.
3. See, e.g., Media Research Center, The Truth About ObamaCare: What the Liberal Media
Aren't Telling You About Obama's Healthcare Plans, http://www.obamacaretruth.org (last visited
Dec. 1, 2010).
4. See, e.g., Joan McCarter, How Insurers Can Game the New System, DAILY Kos, Apr. 1,
2010, http://www.dailykos.com/storyonly/2010/4/1/853166/-How-Insurers-Can-Game-the-
NewSystem (listing several incorrect arguments while advocating that the bill be expanded, along
with listing several complaints that have nothing to do with the bill); Rachel Weiner, Palin:
Obama's "Death Panel" Could Kill My Down Syndrome Baby, HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 8, 2009,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/08/07/palin-obamas-death-paneln 254399.html; The Market
Ticker, http://market-ticker.org/akcs-www?singlepost-2139125 (Mar. 22, 2010, 13:23 EST)
("[T]his is the end of the health industry in America."); Media Research Center, supra note 3
(displaying a segment titled "Busting.Obamacare"); Andrea Santiago, The Medicus Firm Physician
Survey: Health Reform May Lead to Significant Reduction in Physician Workforce, Jan. 2010,
http://www.themedicusfirm.com/pages/medicus-media-survey-reveals-impact-health-reform
("What if nearly half of all physicians in America stopped practicing medicine?"). Comments on
message boards are too numerous and too vicious to cite, but even CNN's relatively tame message
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internal revisions, and a companion bill,5 this legislation is highly complex-
together the bills total 2,562 pages-and confusing. It has also been subject to
wide-ranging popular scrutiny. Under those conditions, it is not surprising that
the bill has been so widely misunderstood: it has been criticized inaccurately as
promoting government-mandated euthanasia6 and a conspiracy to force the
government takeover of health care. 7 It is our hope that the Yale Journal of
Health Policy, Law, and Ethics can help to fill that gap, serving as legal
scholarship's leading examination of this landmark legislation. In doing so, we
hope to help satisfy the great curiosity-both global and national-that the bill
has sparked.
In order to examine the goals of the bill, it is crucial for readers to
understand PPACA's economic foundation. Despite its complexity, PPACA is
not a hodgepodge of miscellaneous ideas; it is, perhaps surprisingly, a very
coherent package. It revolves around one specific provision-the ban on
discrimination against preexisting conditions-and each of the other major
provisions of the bill is designed to protect that one central feature.
Underlying all of health reform is one fundamental question: what is the
purpose of health insurance? Is it meant as an economic and actuarial tool or a
social one?8 PPACA seeks to push the second answer-to use health insurance
to promote socioeconomic solidarity in which the healthy subsidize the sick.9
Pure market insurance redistributes costs only on an ex post basis-it stratifies
pools based on expected health status, and only shares risk based on
unpredictable events. Solidarity insurance, by contrast, does away with this
stratification and shares risk even on an ex ante basis.' 0 The healthy will always
subsidize the unpredictably sick, but market insurance does not ask them to
subsidize the predictably and chronically ill; solidarity insurance does.
This is not a trivial difference. The United States is a nation in which 75% of
all medical expenditures are devoted to chronic illness, which is usually
(including comments such as "Health reform my butt" and "Pelosi needs to see a psychiatrist").
5. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029
(2010) [hereinafter HCERA].
6. See Weiner, supra note 4.
7. See The Market Ticker, supra note 4.
8. Mary Crossley, Discrimination Against the Unhealthy in Health Insurance, 54 U. KAN. L.
REV. 73, 73 (2005).
9. Id.; Frank Pasquale, The Three Faces of Retainer Care: Crafting a Tailored Regulatory
Response, 7 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICs 39, 41 (2007) ("Tiering in the health insurance
market has already eroded the primary 'end' of health insurance: subsidizing the unhealthy,
unlucky, and sick with funds from the healthy, lucky, and well.").
10. For a discussion of ex ante versus ex post distinctions, see Posting of Uwe E. Reinhardt to
Economix, http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/01/is-community-rating-in-health-
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predictable."1 The lowest-spending 49% of the population incurs only 3% of
medical expenses, and the highest-spending 5% incurs 50% of the expenses.12
For insurance to thoroughly redistribute that expense gradient, it requires an
extraordinary amount of coercion-coercion that the markets, on their own, will
not provide.
This is the first and central goal of the PPACA: to prevent health status
discrimination. When it takes effect, insurers will no longer be able to charge
different rates to the sick; they will no longer be able to exclude certain
conditions from coverage; they will no longer be able to stratify premiums and
coverage in accordance with actuarial tables. This ban on discrimination based on
preexisting conditions is the bill's most famous component.
And yet such legislation, standing on its own, would open up a host of
problems. The vast majority of PPACA is thus devoted to solving these created
problems. If insurance companies use the healthy to subsidize the sick, then the
economically rational response is for the healthy to simply drop coverage
entirely.' 3 PPACA thus imposes a mandate-a requirement that every citizen
purchase and maintain health insurance or else pay a fine.14 This solves the
problem of dropping coverage, but it creates a new problem: the government can
hardly force people to purchase something they cannot afford. And so PPACA
thus grants a subsidy.' 5 For those Americans who meet certain income
qualifications, the government will pay a certain proportion of their health
insurance premiums. This, of course, requires money-money that the
government raises through a combination of new taxes,' 6 Medicare and Medicaid
11. NAT'L CTR. FOR CHRONIC DISEASE PREVENTION & HEALTH PROMOTION, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, THE POWER OF PREVENTION: CHRONIC DISEASE. .. THE PUBLIC HEALTH
CHALLENGE OF THE 21ST CENTURY 1 (2009), available at http://www.cdc.gov/
chronicdisease/pdf/2009-Power-of-Prevention.pdf.
12. Mark W. Stanton, Agency for Healthcare Research & Quality, The High Concentration of
US. Health Care Expenditures, RES. ACTION, June 2006, at 1, available at http://www.ahrq.gov/
research/ria I 9/expendria.pdf.
13. David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based Health Insurance, 2
YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 23, 26 (2001) ("Commentators wax poetic about the social role
of health insurance, and treat the decision to offer and purchase such coverage in morally weighted
terms. However, the evidence is fairly clear that potential subscribers approach coverage decisions
in traditional economic terms.") (emphasis added).
14. PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501, 124 Stat. 119, 242-49 (2010), modifiedby § 10106;
amended by HCERA, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1002, 124 Stat. 1029, 1032-33 (2010) (to be codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 18091, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A).
15. PPACA § 1401, 124 Stat. at 213-20 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 36, 26 U.S.C. § 280C);
HCERA § 1001(a)(1)(A), 124 Stat. at 1030-31.
16. See, e.g., PPACA § 1501, 124 Stat. at 242-49, modified by § 10106, amended by HCERA
§ 1002, 124 Stat. at 1032-33 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18091, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A) (fines from
3
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cuts,' 7 and other financial provisions.' 8 These four elements comprise the central
provisions of PPACA. Each is devoted to the social solidarity model of health
insurance and the economic difficulties that such a model presents, and thus
PPACA expands access dramatically. CBO projects that it will reduce America's
uninsured by thirty-two million Americans-no small feat.' 9
Still, PPACA does not provide universal coverage-some Americans will
fall through the cracks. The first piece of our collection, Mark Hall's
Approaching Universal Coverage with Better Safety-Net Programs for the
the individual mandate); PPACA § 1513(a), 124 Stat. at 253-55, amended by HCERA § 1003(b)(2),
124 Stat. at 1033 (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 4980H) (fines from the employer mandate);
PPACA § 9001, 124 Stat. at 847-53, amended by HCERA § 1401, 124 Stat. 1059-60 (to be codified
at 26 U.S.C. § 49801) (excise tax on "Cadillac" plans); PPACA § 9015(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 870-71,
modified by § 10906, amended by HCERA § 1402(b)(2), 124 Stat. at 1063 (to be codified at 26
U.S.C. § 3101) (additional 0.9% payroll tax); HCERA § 1402(a), 124 Stat. at 1060-63 (3.8%
investment income tax); PPACA § 9008, 124 Stat. 859-62, amended by HCERA § 1404, 124 Stat.
at 1064 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 4001) (pharmaceutical industry fees); HCERA § 1405, 124
Stat. at 1064-65 (excise tax on medical devices); PPACA § 10907, 124 Stat. at 1020 (to be codified
at 26 U.S.C. § 5000B and note) (indoor tanning tax, nullifying § 9017, a tax on cosmetic medical
procedures); PPACA § 6301(e)(2)(A), 124 Stat. at 743-46 ($2-per-enrollee insurance industry tax);
PPACA § 9010, 124 Stat. at 865-68, modified by § 10905, amended by HCERA § 1406(a)(4), 124
Stat. at 1066 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 4001 note prec.) (insurance industry fees); PPACA §§
2501-2502, 124 Stat. at 306-10 (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.)
(increasing Medicaid reimbursement for prescription drugs).
17. See, e.g., PPACA § 2551, 124 Stat. at 312-15, modifiedby § 10201(f) (to be codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1396r-4(f)) (reducing payments to Disproportionate Share Hospitals); PPACA § 3112,
124 Stat. at 421 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395iii) (eliminating the "Medicare Improvement
Fund"); PPACA § 3201(b), 124 Stat. at 444 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-23(c)(6))
(specifying a spending freeze for 2011's Medicare Advantage Program); § 3201 (d)(2), 124 Stat. at
445 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-2(a)(6)(B)) (codifying a more competitive, actuarially-
based bidding process for Medicare Advantage); PPACA § 3401, 124 Stat. at 480 (to be codified at
42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(b)(3)(B)) (implementing severe "market basket reductions" to reimbursment
scales for providers).
18. See, e.g., PPACA § 3023, 124 Stat. at 399-403, modified by § 10308 (to be codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1395cc-4) (a pilot program for payment bundling); PPACA § 10326, 124 Stat. at 961-62
(to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395b-1 note) (a pilot program for pay-for-performance); PPACA §
2702, 124 Stat. at 156 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1) (reducing payments to hospitals
which report too many hospital acquired conditions); PPACA § 6402(i), 124 Stat. at 760-62
(increasing funding to the Health Care Fraud Abuse and Control Fund); PPACA § 6002, 124 Stat.
at 689-96 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7h) (mandating disclosure where physicians have
some ownership in drug or device manufacturers).
19. Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to Representative Nancy
Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (Mar. 20, 2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/
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Uninsured, explores the populations that will remain uninsured after PPACA's
provisions are implemented and the "safety net" options through which they
might continue to receive care. PPACA expands funding for such safety net
programs-such as Federally Qualified Health Centers (FQHCs)20-but also
presents a new challenge for those services. As Professor Hall argues, safety net
programs must now also seek to prevent free-riding behavior, lest it undermine
solidarity insurance. This element of PPACA-expanding the means and
complicating the mission of the safety net-has been highly underappreciated,
especially in comparison to the controversy surrounding the constitutionality of
the mandate. 2 ' And yet for millions of Americans, it will be the only element of
health reform that actually impacts their lives. It must not be overlooked.
Perhaps the largest elephant in the room, however, is the question of cost-
control. In and of itself, the bill does not impose any surefire ways to control the
nation's overall health expenditures. 22 Yet the mandate absolutely depends upon
such control. If costs continue to escalate, then they will place the mandate in
danger-and with it, the entire purpose of health reform. In a tentative January
estimate, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that the bronze
family plan, already a low-benefits package, would probably average more than
$12,00023 -approximately double the current national average.24 Plans could
rise by $6,000 a year or more. And this estimate lines up well with the empirical
evidence as seen in New York's insurance regulation25 and the evidence
regarding our nation's underlying health expense distribution.26 Somehow,
CBO's dire predictions have gone underappreciated by observers.
If excess premiums charged to the healthy are higher than the fine associated
with the mandate, a rational actor will be motivated to drop coverage and simply
20. PPACA § 5601(a), 124 Stat. at 677; § 10503, 124 Stat. at 1004 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2546-2).
21. See, e.g., Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 716 F.
Supp. 2d 1120 (N.D. Fl. 2010) (denying motion to dismiss some counts of a lawsuit filed by the
State of Florida and 19 other states challenging the constitutionality of the mandate).
22. For agreement with this assessment, see commentary from Atul Gawande, Testing,
Testing, NEW YORKER, Dec. 14, 2009, at 34 ("But the legislation has no master plan for dealing
with the problem of soaring medical costs.").
23. Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to Senator Olympia
Snowe, U.S. Senate (Jan. I1, 2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/108xx/docl0884/01-
11-Premiums for Bronze Plan.pdf.
24. See AMERICA'S HEALTH INSURANCE PLANS, INDIVIDUAL HEALTH INSURANCE 2009 4
(2009), available at http://www.ahipresearch.org/pdfs/ 2009IndividualMarketSurveyFinalReport
.pdf.
25. AMERICA'S HEALTH INSURANCE PLANS, supra note 24, at 5; Anemona Hartocollis, New
York Offers Costly Lessons on Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2010, at Al.
26. See Stanton, supra note 12, at 1.
5
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pay the fine. 27 Further, if premiums rise high enough, many families will fall into
a built-in "hardship exemption" where the fine will not apply. 28 If many of the
healthy drop coverage-one of Professor Hall's concerns, especially if the safety
net is robust-premiums will rise further, prompting yet more people to drop
their insurance. Premiums will then rise again, sparking what is known as the
"adverse selection death spiral" of insurance. 2 9
The bill, therefore, absolutely depends upon controlling medical
expenditures. Can it do so? There are no surefire, definitive cost-control
mechanisms in the bill, and yet there is some reason for optimism. 30
One prominent cost-control attempt is the Independent Payment Advisory
Board (IPAB), established to make certain expenditure-reducing
recommendations to Congress. Timothy Jost explores the philosophy, politics,
and powers of this Board in his piece, The Independent Medicare Advisory
Board. CBO does not expect much from the Board-CBO projects that it will
create only $15 billion in savings over ten years 3'-but concedes that there is
room for wide variation. Professor Jost explores some of the ways in which the
IPAB might accomplish its goals.
Nonetheless, it will be a tall order for any one panel, however expert, to
resolve America's health care cost troubles. To that end, it is possible-perhaps
likely-that the issue of cost control will have to be revisited. What form might
that revisiting take? When might it be necessary, and how strong will it have to
be? For that matter, which of PPACA's broader goals will be accomplished, and
at what price?
None of these answers will come easily, but perhaps the most direct
guidance will come from the prior Massachusetts health reform. Much of
PPACA strongly resembles that state's Chapter 58 reform from 2006, and so
27. PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501, 124 Stat. 119, 244-45, modified by § 10106 (2010);
amended by HCERA, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1002, 124 Stat. 1029, 1032-33 (to be codified at 26
U.S.C. § 5000A) (establishing the fine as the greater of $695 or 2.5% of the taxpayer's income in
excess of the threshold amount at which a tax return is required). See I.R.C. § 6012(a)(1) and §
151(d)(1) (indicating that no return needs to be filed for incomes below the exemption amount, and
that that exemption amount is $2,000, respectively, adjusted for inflation since 1989). See Internal
Revenue Service, 1040 Instructions 2009, 8, chart A, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/il040.pdf
(listing updated threshold amounts).
28. PPACA § 1501(b), 124 Stat. at 246-47 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A) (establishing
a hardship exemption if insurance costs more than 8% of a family's income).
29. For usage of the term, see, for example, Hartocollis, supra note 25.
30. See Gawande, supra note 22, at 34 ("Which of these programs will work? We can't know.
That's why the Congressional Budget Office doesn't credit any of them with substantial
savings .... But, in the end, it contains a test of almost every approach that leading health-care
experts have suggested.")
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Massachusetts can provide an early look at what PPACA's results might be.
Stephen Weiner's piece, Payment Reform After PPACA: Is Massachusetts
Leading the Way Again?, explores the differences and similarities between
Massachusetts's reform and the federal reform bill, as well as the successes and
failures of Chapter 58. He helps us see which of Massachusetts's results might
apply to the nation as a whole, and which were dictated by conditions specific to
that state.
Perhaps most prominently, Massachusetts did not feel that its Chapter 58
was a complete and comprehensive reform. To the contrary, Massachusetts
waited just two years before addressing the cost issue in greater depth with its
Chapter 305 legislation. PPACA, like Chapter 58, focuses chiefly on access
problems. But, as Payment Reform After PPACA: Is Massachusetts Leading the
Way Again? explains, Massachusetts did not believe that this was a
comprehensive solution to what ails health care today, and so undertook a second
aggressive reform just two years later. Even as this issue goes to publication,
Massachusetts is considering a third reform. Many of those ideas could be
applied to federal health reform, especially if, as CBO projects, costs actually
accelerate. The Comment examines the core ideas involved in Chapter 305,
assesses their applicability to the federal level, and prepares us for what may
perhaps prove to be the second round in the battle over health reform.
PPACA has many laudable intentions and will provide valuable services to
many Americans who have previously been underserved. Many of these reforms,
however, will not be sustainable if expenditures continue to grow as quickly as
they have, much less if they accelerate. If costs continue to spiral, they will derail
the mandate and, with it, the rest of PPACA's goals. Perhaps the IPAB will live
up to its promise, innovating new payment mechanisms and solving the game
theory problem that underlies so much of American health care, or perhaps other
provisions of PPACA will prove more important than expected. But it seems
more likely that Congress will have to follow the lead of Massachusetts by
revisiting the issue of cost control and implementing bold new solutions itself.
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